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Battle of Antietam 
Never before or since in American History was so 
much blood shed on a single day as on September 17, 1862, 
at the battle of Antietam. For the clarification of the 
reader, the battle of Antiteam bears a double name--the 
troops of the North referred to the battle as Antietam 
while their counterparts referred to the engagement as 
Sharpsburg. Regardless as to its name, this historic 
battle was the turning point of the Civil War and the 
high tide of the Confederacy. 11he purpose of this paper 
is to tell the story of General Lee's march into Maryland 
which culminated in the battle of Antietam. It is not 
within the scope of this paper to give a detailed account 
of every military engagement but rather an overall picture 
of the Maryland campaign. 
Following the battle of Second Bull Run on August 
29th and 30th (in which John Pope was badly defeated), 
General George McClellan was placed in command of the 
defense of Washington. 1 At the time of McC~ellan 1 s 
appointment, President Lincoln and General Halleck 
regarded Washington as lost, but General Halleck boosted 
the men's morale and Washington was made safe from attack.2 
General Lee did not attack Washington but instead 
crossed the Potomac into Maryland. Lee had many reasons 
lRobert Johnson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, New York: Devine Press, 1888, P• 549. 
-
2~., pp. 551-552. 
for crossing into Maryland, the major one being the hope 
that a successful invasion would lead to recognition of 
the Confederacy by the British. Once the South was 
recognized, overt aid might be obtained from England and 
.France. 'l'he second reason for ~rossing the Potomac was 
2 
to relieve the war-torn state of Virginia from the ravages 
of contending armies. It was felt that the losses of men 
and material might be replenished from the North. A final 
reason for sending the Army of Northern Virginia northward 
was to capitalize on recent Southern victories and to 
woo the important border state of Maryland into joining 
the Confederacy.3 
Despite the many sound arguments for taking the 
war to the North, General Lee showed concern for the 
Maryland campaign in the following letter to President 
Davis: 
The army is not properly supplied 
for an invasion of an enemy territory. 
It lacks much of the material of war, is 
feeble in transportation, the animals 
being much reduced, and the men are 
poorly provided with clothes, and in 
thousa~ds of instances are destitute of 
shoes.4 
There were many reasons to worry about the success 
of the Maryland campaign, but straggling was the biggest 
concern. Straggling was caused by wornout shoes and 
improper diet. The men's feet were not calloused and, 
since General Lee did not permit plundering, the army 
3L. VanLOanNaisawald, "Why Confederates Crossed 
Potomac," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 
(August, 19b2), PP• 20-21. 
4rbid., p. 21. 
3 
lived on green corn and fruit. Many of the men had bad 
cases of diarrhea which weakened them physically and caused 
much absence without leave from the ranks. The march into 
Maryland is often referred to as the "green corn campaign."5 
A young recruit from Georgia, when questioned about his 
absence from the ranks during the battle of Antietam 
explained: 
I had no shoes, I tried it barefoot, 
but somehow my feet wouldn't callous. They just kept bleeding. I found it hard to 
keep up though I had the heart of a patroit 
I began to feel that I didnft have patriotic 
feet. Of course, I could have crawled on my 
hands and knees, but then my hands would 6 have got so sore I couldn't fire my rifle. 
Despite the discomfort of his men Lee crossed the 
Potomac and entered Maryland. His objective was to destroy 
federal communication~ wlth the West and then turn his 
attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.7 
Lee's Army crossed the Potomac on September 4th. 
Curiosity seekers were disheartened when they failed to 
get a glimpse of Le~ and Jackson. Both men had been 
injured in separate riding accidents and were forced to 
enter Maryland in ambulances. On September 6th, the 
Confederate army pitched camp near Fredrick. Many 
visitors came out to the camp to greet the Confederates, 
5nouglass Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, Vol.,II; 
New York: Charles L. Webster Co., 1943, pp. l4b-52. 
6B. A. Botkin, A Ci v1,l War 'lreasury of 'I'ales, Legends, 
and Folxlore, New ~Qr~: Random House, 19bO, p. 112. 
7Johnson, II, p. 605. 
4 
with Longstreet and Stuart serving as the official greeters. 
Longstreet was suffering with a badly rubbed heel, but it 
was said that Stuart (being at his usual self) was ready 
to see and talk with every good looking woman in sight.a 
If failing to get a glimpse of the Confederate 
generals was disheartening then it is doubtful if the 
author can express in words the disappointment the 
MaPylanders must have felt when they saw the typical 
Confederate soldier. Here is a description of "Johnny 
Reb" in Maryland. 
None had any under-clothing. My costume 
consisted of a ragged pair of trousers, 
a stained dirty jacket, and old slouch 
hat, the brim pinned up with a thorn; 
a begrimed blanket over my shoulder, 
a grease smeared cotton haversack 
full of apples and corn, a cartridge 
box full and a musket. I was barefooted 
and had a stone bruise on each foot ••• 
There was no one there who would not 
have been "run in" by the police had he 
appea~ed on the street of any populous 
city.'7 
As the Confederate,army moved northward, McClellan 
and Secretary Seward saw the need for the evacuation of 
Harper's Ferry. This Federal garrison would be in direct 
line of Lee's invasion of Maryland and would probably 
be captured. In trying to convince General Halleck of 
the need for the evacuation, Seward and McClellan called 
8Freeman, II, PP• 153-54. 
9sruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday Inc., 19S;, pp. 449-50. 
on the general one evening but were unable to persuade 
him.10 
5 
Without proper orders, McClellan started northward 
in pursuit of Lee's army. He had, to use his own words, 
started the campaign with a noose around his neck.11 
McClellan, acting with his usual slowness, moved his 
force, interposing it between Washington and Lee, in three 
movements northward {see Map I, p. 33). The advance 
from Washington was covered by the cavalry led by 
General Pleasanton, who was soon in constant contact, 
with the enemy's cavalry. McC1ellan hoped first, to 
gain accurate information as to Lee's movements, and 
second, to push the work of supply and reorganization 
as rapidly as possible. 
Maryland received Lee's army rather decently but 
the Army could not regard itself as welcome. One exception 
to the rule was the warm reception General J. E. B. Stuart 
received at Urbana, Maryland. In return for the hospitality 
he had received, he gave a ball with the army band 
furnishing the music. This charming occasion came to a 
sudden halt when McClellan's advance guard struck the 
outpost. Following a sharp skirmish, the Confederates 
hastened back "covered with glory" and the dancing was 
resumed. The final interruption of the dancing came 
lOJohnson, II, pp. 550-54. 
llibid., pp. 550-54. 
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when the wounded were brought in. After startled shrieks, 
the women started dressing the men's wounds. One wounded 
fellow remarked that he would get hit any day to have 
such a pretty surgeon dress his wounds. The dance over, 
the soldiers escorted their "lovely angels" home by the 
light of the moon and bid them an affectionate farewe11.12 
Many stories, some of them fictional, have been 
written about Lee's occupation of Maryland. The most 
prominent story of the Fredrick occupation was that of 
Barbara Frietchie. 'I'his grand old lady was supposed to 
have unfurled the Union banner in defiance to Jackson's 
troops. The entire story was written up on a poem 
by Whittier which was mere Union propaganda. However, 
Jackson was the subject of several true stories that 
date from the occupation of Fredrick. On September 
6th, General Jackson was waylaid by two Baltimore girls 
who paralyzed him with smiles, embraces, and questions. 
Then, seemingly satisfied, they drove off. Jackson was so 
emba.rrased that he stayed in his tent the rest of the 
day. The following day he attended church services at 
the German Reformed Church. In the midst of the services 
Jackson fell soundly asleep and the loyal Union preacher 
prayed for President Lincoln. •stonewall" was finally 
awakened by the organ music, and when told of the prayers 
12Botkin, pp. 218-19. 
for Lincoln, was quite amused and stated, "I'm sure he 
needs it .nl3 
Fullfilling McClellan's and Seward's fears, Lee 
7 
sent six of his nine infantry divisions against Harper's 
Ferry. The orders called for a three pronged encirclement 
of and an attack on Harper's Ferry. McLaws' division was to 
go by way of Pleasant Valley and capture Maryland Heights. 
Jackson was to march sixty miles north and west and drive 
out the 2500 Federal forces at Martinsburg. Having 
completed this task, he would march southward and take 
Bolivar Heights. J. G. Walker's division was to follow 
the Monocacy River to the Potomac and destroy an aqueduct 
on the Chespeake and Ohio Canal. On completion of this 
assignment, he was to cross the Potomac, into Virginia 
and occupy Loudon Heights across the Shenandoah River 
looking down upon Harper's Ferry.14 By splitting the 
Confederate forces in enemy country, Lee showed contempt 
for the Union army. He expressed his faith in his plan 
when he wrote his thoughts about General McClellan to 
J. G • Walker : 
He is an:able general but a very 
cautious one. His enemies among his own 
people think him too much so. His army 
is in a very demoralized and chaotic 
condition, and will not be prepared for 
offensive opera tion--or he wLl.l not 
think it so--for three or four weeks. 
13 6 Johnson, II, p. 20. 
14Robert D. Hoffsommer, "Jackson's Capture of Harper's 
Ferry,• Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 
1962), pp. 12-13. 
Before that lime I hope to be on the 
Susquehanna. '.:> 
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On September 10th, the plan was set into action as 
McLaws moved westws.rd from Fredrick and the following day 
crossed South Mountain to Brownsville in Pleasant Valley. 
1rhe plan called for the army to be at Harper's Ferry on 
the 12th. By nightfall of that date McLaws had reached 
the Potomac three miles from the objective. At 10:30 A.M. 
the following morning the 17th Mississippi fired on 
Federal sharpshooters and by 4:30 P.M. all Federals were 
cleared from Maryland Heights and Sandy Hook. Next 
morning a road was cut to the summit and guns were placed 
16 in position two days behind schedule. 
Jackson had left for Harper's Ferry by crossing 
South Mountain at '11urner' s Pass on September 10th. The 
night WAS spent encamped at Boobesboro where a minor 
engagement took place. Jackson traveled toward Martins-
burg in a great curve via Williamsport. The 2500 
Federal troops garrisoned at Martinsburg under Brigadier 
General Julius White promptly left to reinforce troops at 
Harper's Ferry. After a hard day's march, Jackson was 
persuaded by his host to drink a whisky toddy of which 
he said: 
••• he believed he liked the taste of 
whisky and brandy more than any soldier 
in the army; that they were more palatable 
to him than the most fragrant coffee, and 
15Johnson,, II, p. 606. 
16t""'reeman,, II, p. 187. 
for that realQn with others, he rarely 
tasted them. f 
(It was at Martinsburg that Jackson's local feminine fan 
club stripped him of the buttons on his uniform in quest 
of souvenirs.) 
By the 13th, Jackson's divisions were in position 
west of Bolivar Heights and by the 14th, the encirclement 
was complete (see Map II, P• 34). 
The third attack column under Walker attempted to 
destroy an aqueduct on the Chespeake and Ohio Canal but 
failed. Receiving Special Orders 191, Walker moved 
toward Harper's Ferry via Fillsboro. Ha arrived at 
Loudon Heights on the 13th. No resistance was given, 
and batteries were mounted two days behind schedule. 
September 14.th found seventy guns pointing towards 
9 
Harper's Ferry. This was to be an artilleryman's paradise 
or like "shooting fish in a barrel." On the same day 
Jackson signalled McLaws and Walker the following 
message: 
Harper's .Ferry is completely invested. 
I shall swnrnon its commander to surrender. 
Should he refuse I shall give him twenty-
four hours to remove the non-combata~gs 
and then carry the place by assault. 
With Harper's Ferry near capitulation, ill fortune 
struck the Army of N0 rthern Virginia. 'l'he 27th Indiana 
had arrived near Fredrick on September 13th, a warm 
17 6 Johnson, II, p. 23. 
18~., pp. 607-609. 
autumn day. 1I'wo Federal soldiers, Private Barton W. 
Mitchell and Sergeant M. Bloss, in search of a shade 
tree noticed a paper on the ground. Within the paper 
were wrapped several fresh cigars which were promptly 
divided and then the importance of the document was 
noticed. The paper passed up the echelons of command 
until Colonel s. E. Pittman recognized the handwriting 
and the signature as Assistant Adjutant General R. H. 
Chilton's. 19 Pittman took the document to McClellan 
who was in conference but due to its importance he read 
the following order: 
10 
Headquarters Army of Northern Va 
Sept. 9, 1862 • 
Special Orders, No. 191 
The army will resume its march tomorrow, 
taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's 
command will form the advance and after passing 
Middletown, with such portion as he may select, 
will take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross 
the Potomac at the most convenient point, 
and by Friday night take possession of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such 
of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and 
intercept such as may attempt to escape 
from Harper's Ferry. 
Gen. Longstreet's command will pursue 
the same road as far as Boonsborough, where 
it will halt with reserve, supply and baggage 
trains of the army. 
Gen. McLaws, with his own division and 
that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. 
Longstreet; and reaching Middletown he will 
take the route to Harper's Ferry and by Friday 
morning possess himself of the Maryland 
Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy 
at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 
19James v. Marfin, "The Lost Orders,• Civil War 
'rimes Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962}, pp. 28-29. 
Gen. Walker with his division after 
accomplishing the object in which he is now 
engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's 
ford ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, 
take possession of Loudon•s Heights, if 
practical, by Friday morning; Key's ford 
on his left, and the road between the end 
of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. 
He will, as far as practical. co-operate with 
Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson in intercepting 
the retreat of the enemy. 
Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form 
the rear guard of the army pursuing the road 
taken by the main body. 'l'he reserve artillery 
ordanance and supply trains, etc., will precede 
Gen. Hill. 
Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron of 
cavalry to accompany the commands of Gen. 
Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws and with the 
main body of the cavalry will cover the route 
of the army and bring up all stragglers that 
may have been left behind. 
The commands of Gens. Jackson, McLaws, 
and Walker, after accomplishing the objects 
for which they have been detached, will join 
the main body of the army at Boonsborough or 
Hagerstown. 
Each regiment on the march will 
habitually carry its axes in the regimental 
ordnance-wagon for use of the men at their 
encampments, to procure wood, etc. 
By command of Gen. R. E. Lee. 
R • H. Chi 1 ton 
Assist. Adj. Gen. 
Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hil~ 
Commanding Division 0 
wra.ving the paper around McClellan said to one 
general, "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip 
'Bobbie Lee,' I will be willing to go home." To Lincoln 
McClellan wrote that he had the plans of the enemy and 
11 
was confident of success. He also gave the President the 
20George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, New 
York: Charles L. Webster Co., 1887, p. 573. 
important military information that he had been received 
enthusiastically by the ladies of Maryland.21 
12 
'l1he lost Orders No. 191 were issued September 9th, 
and on the 13th McClellan held the same orders. Six copies 
of the 111 fated order had been issued to (1) Longstreet, 
(2) Jackson, (3) D. H. Hill, (4) McLaws, (5) Walker, and 
(6) Lee's official record book. However, Jackson had made 
a copy of Order 191 from his own orders for his brother-
in-law, D. H. Hill. Lee's copy to Hill never arrived and 
thus must have been the Lost Order. Quite apart from 
the question of who was responsible for the loss of the 
document, it should be pointed out that according to one 
report the orders were found on D. H. Hill's old campsite 
wrapped around cigars. For what it is worth, D. H. Hill 
did smoke cigars.22 
Upon receiving Order 191, General McClellan conceived 
the idea to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. 
He moved with caution because of a Pinkerton report which 
numbered Lee's army at 120,000 and Order 191 referred to 
Longstreet as the "main body" of the army at Boonesboro. 
In reality D. H. Hill and Longstreet's command numbered 
15,000 men of which 10,000 were twelve miles beyond 
Boonesboro at Hagerstown.23 
21T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952, p. 166. 
22James v. Murfin, Civil War Times Illustrated, 
Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962), pp. 28-29. 
23Dwight E. Stinson, "'rhe Battle of South Mountain," 
Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5, (August, 1962), 
pp. 14-15. 
13 
By night fall on the 13th McC1ellan's cavalry, led 
by Pleasanton, had reached the base of Squth Mountain. 
McClellan ordered the bulk of his 87,000 man a~my toward 
Middletown to offer fight to Lee's "main body" at Turner's 
Gap or Boonesboro. Franklin's corps was ordered to relieve 
Harper's Ferry and destroy McLaws in Pleasant Valley. 
General Franklin was to attack Crampton 1 s Gap at daybreak, 
the 14th, and use all "intellect and the utmost activity 
that a general can exercise."24 
General Lee at Hagerstown was quite uneasy owing 
to reports from Stuart that enemy infantry was approaching 
'l'urner 1 s Gap and reports were lagging from Harper 1 s Ferry. 
General Longstreet and General D. H. Hill suggested to Lee 
that he concentrate at Sharpsburg rather than 'l'urner' s Pass. 
Lee quickly overruled this idea and sent Stuart and Hill 
to hold the Gap. Longstreet's command was ordered to 
join Hill the next morning.(l.4th). 
At daybreak of the 14th, as Hill rode out to 
study the situation, he heard the rumbling of wheels of 
the Federals coming up the mountain. Looking for Stuart, 
he soon learned that J. E. B. had gone to Crampton•s Gap 
to aid McLaws. Hill hurriedly deployed his troops, 
putting Garland's brigade on his right to hold Fox's 
Gap (known as the old Sharpsburg Road). Colquit's 
brigade was to hold the ground dominating Turner's Gap 
(see Map III, p. 34). Contact with the Federal army 
was established at 9:00 A.M. with Cox's division charging 
vigorously on Fox's Gap. Under a fierce fire General 
Garland fell with a mortal wound and his brigade broke 
and was driven from the field. Cox's attack was stopped 
at Mountain House by G. B. Anderson's b~igade and Cox 
retired to the crest of Fox's Gap. Thus, all action 
stopped; the first phase of the battle of South Mountain 
was over.25 
McClellan was not surprised that Cox had been 
repulsed because he felt that he was fighting the "main 
body" of Lee's army. As the reader will recall, this 
misconception was gained from "Lost Order 191." D. H. Hill 
said later that this order was worth 10,000 men to him 
because it gave him time to strengthen his position. 
McClellan was also strengthening his position by sending 
Hooker's corps to the right and Reno's corps to the left. 
The Confederates were further strengthened when Longstreet's 
division arrived at 3:30 P. M., although confusion reigned 
supreme for a time while his troops were deployed.26 
The second phase of the Battle of South Mountain 
began at 5:00 P.M. with the advance of Reno and Hooker. 
The Confederates fought gallantly, but slowly they were 
losing ground. Rhodes, on the Confederate extreme left, 
25Freeman, II, p. i74. 
26 6 McClellan, p. 57 • 
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lost a strategic hill to Seymour, and Drayton•s brigade 
was driven back only to be saved by JoJ:m B. Hood. Colquitt 
had turned back a charge by Gibbon's b~igade on the 
National Road (see Map III, p. 34). The fighting lasted 
until ten o'clock that evening with the casualties numbering 
2300 for the Confederates. Federal losses were put at 1831 
plus the loss of Federal General Jesse Reno who was killed 
while inspecting his skirmish lines.27 
September 14th found Lee withdrawing to Sharpsburg 
and ready to retreat from Maryland. The general posted 
his forces on the Sharpsburg Heights, his line running 
north and south and lying to the east of Hagerstown--
Harper 1 s Ferry Pike (see Map V, p. 36).28 He then sent 
the following message to McLaws at Harper's Ferry: 
General: The day has gone against us and 
this army will go by Sharpsburg and across 
the river it is necessary for you to abandon 
your position (on Maryland Hts.} ••• 
ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, 
and if you can find any between you and 
Shepherdstown, leave t~A Shepherdstown 
Ford for this command. / 
Lee's fighting spirit was restored when he received 
a message from Jackson stating: Harper's Ferry will 
probably fall tomorrow (15th) and his men would rejoin 
27Freeman, II, p. 183. 
2Bwarren H. Hassler, General George B. McClellan, 
Baton Rouge: Louisianna State University Press, p. 266. 
29Freeman, II, p. 192. 
him later.30 
General McClellan, jubilant following the Battle 
of South Mountain, wired General Halleck the following 
message: 
After a very severe engagement the 
corps of Hooker and Reno have carried the 
heights commanding the Hagerstown road. 
The troops behaved magnificently. They 
never fought better. • • 'I'he action 
continued until after dark and terminated 
leaving us in possession of the entire 31 
crest. It has been a glorious victory. 
16 
While the Battle of South Mountain was being fought, 
Franklin's corps moving on Harper's Ferry was engaged with 
McLaws at Crampton's Gap (five miles south of Turner's Gap). 
Franklin deployed his troops after three hours of meticulous 
preparation, placing Slosum's division on the right and 
Smith's division on the left (see Map IV, p. 35). The 
Federal advance was made over open ground and under 
Confederate artillery fire. r11he advance sent the Confeder-
ates scurrying from the hill and Franklin had won a 
smashing victory. However, darkness prevented Franklin 
from following up this victory until the next day. On 
the 15th, Franklin learned that McLaws had stretched his 
defense across Pleasant Valley and an attack would be 
fatal.32 
.As the Battle of Crampton' s Gap was in full progress 
3 o!lli. , p. i 92 • 
31H. J. Eckenrode, George B. McClellan, New York: 
Van Rees Press, p. 186. 
32Johnson, II, PP• 591-97• 
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Walker (at Harper's Ferry) heard the gunfire and signalled 
Jackson that McC1ellan must be advancing in force. Jackson's 
reply was that it was probably a cavalry engagement between 
Stuart and Pleasanton. Walker was not satisfied with that 
answer and feared if the Federals were given twenty-four 
hours to surrender at Harper's Ferry, Lee might be in 
grave danger. Walker then asked Jackson's permission to 
fire on the fort, but Jackson gave no reply. Seizing 
the opportunity, Walker placed troops in full Federal 
view and the "Yanks" opened their fire. This was exactly 
what General Walker had wanted and all the Confederate 
guns opened fire. The firing continued until five o'clock 
that evening and only one or two of the Federal guns were 
left.33 
On the night of September 14th, the only bright 
spot of the entire Harper's Ferry affair took place as 
Colonel B. F. (Grimes) Davis and 1300 Union cavalry escaped 
Harper's Ferry. They crossed the pontoon bridge north to 
Sharpsburg and passed through that city at daybreak of 
the 15th. While crossing the Hagerstown and Williamsport 
road, Longstreet's ammunition train was captured. The 
train consisted of 97 wagons and 600 men.34 
September 15th dawned foggy at Harper•s'Ferry and 
the bombardment continued until 8:00 A. M., at which time 
33rb1d., PP• 609-610. 
34~., p. 611. 
the fortress surrendered. General A. P. Hill was put in 
charge of the surrender which netted 12,520 prisoners, 
13,000 arms, 73 pieces of artillery, and several hundred 
wagons. Many of the Union soldiers were curious to see 
Jackson as he rode in, many saluted him and he returned 
their salutes. One Union soldier said, "Boys, he's not 
much for looks, but if we'd had him we wouldn't been 
caught in this trap\•35 
18 
Jackson's troops then prepared two days rations 
and started for Sharpsburg. The march by Jackson's own 
admission was "severe." As the regiments, on the morning 
of the 16th, one after another reached Sharpsburg, the 
men dropped to the ground and Jackson rode on to report 
to Lee. Lee was glad to see Jackson for it seemed that 
the Federals in vast numbers were preparing for a battle 
and Jackson could help reinforce the thin Confederate 
line drawn up behind Antietam Creek. Jackson and Lee 
surveyed the situation and decided McClellan must know 
their situation owing to the boldness of this usually 
cautious man. General Longstreet advised Lee against 
fighting here but was overruled and Jackson relied on 
Lee's judgement.36 
McClellan was organizing his forces for the on-
35Freeman, II, p. 199. 
36~., p. 201. 
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coming battle by reconnoitering, clearing approaches, 
and massing his cannon on the east side of Antietam creek. 
The artillery position favored the Federals and they were 
able to do here what McClellan had done at Malvern Hill. 
The Union guns could sweep the Confederate positions with 
a )aail of iron. As a result, Sharpsburg was known as 
"Artillery Hell" for the southern cannoneers. 
McClellan's activities are shown by a wire tele-
graphed to Halleck on the 16th: 
The enemy yesterday held a position just 
in front of Sharpsburg. When our troops 
arrived in sufficient fore~ it was too 
late in the day to attack.'7 · 
Had McClellan attacked Lee, the Confederate leader 
would have had fourteen brigades (18 1 000 men) of infantry 
compared to McClellan's six corps (75 1 000 men).38 
This morning (16th) a heavy fog has thus 
far pre~ented us doing more than to ascer-
tain that some of the enemy are still there. 
Do not know in what force. Will attack as 
soon as situation of enemy is developed ••• 
'I'he time lost on account of the fog is 
being occupied in getting up supplies, 
for the want o~9which many of our men 
are suffering. 
From the Pry house where McClellan had established 
his headquarters came the Union battle plans. 
My plans for the impending general engagement 
37Freeman, II, p. 202. 
38Fredrick Tilberg 1 Antietam, United States Department 
of Interior Handbook Series No. 31, (Washington: u.s. 
Goverrunent Printing Office, 1961), pp. 15-16. 
39Eckenrode 1 p. 189. 
was to attack the enemy's left with the corps 
of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's 
and if necessary by Franklin's, and as soon 
as matters looked favorable there to move 
the corps of Burnside against the enemy's 
extreme right, upon the ridge running to 
the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having 
carried their position, to press along the 
crest toward our right, and whenever either 
of these flank movements should be successful, 
to advance our c~3ter with all the forces 
then disposable.4 
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The first movement of Federal troops came at 2 P.M. 
on the 16th, as Hooker marched his troops across the Antietam 
Creek at the Keedysville Road bridge (upper bridge). 
Hooker moved in a northwesterly direction until he reached 
the Hagerstown Pike where he turned southward towards 
Sharpsburg (see Map V, p. 36). Union soldiers marched 
down the pike unmolested until about sunset when they ran 
into Hood's division of Confederates pickets. A short 
skirmish ensued and Lee was alerted as to the direction 
from which the main attack would probably come. At 
midnight more F'ederal troops crossed the creek under 
the command of General Mansfield. This XII Corps consisted 
of two divisions under Williams and Greene. They 
bivouacked one mile behind Hooker's corps on the J. 
Poffenberger farm at 2 A. M. on the 17th.4l 
It will be helpful in understanding the battle 
of Antietam to view the engagement in three phases. The 
4oJohnson, II, p. 633. 
41McClell~n, pp. 590-91. 
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battle was actually fought in a piecemeal fashion rather 
than as an all out attack. It should also be pointed out 
that the numerical strength of the two opposing armies 
on the eve of the battle differed greatly. McClellan 
stated that he had 87,164 men available for duty, this 
was a careless and misleading figure. The actual combat 
effectives numbered 70,000 to 75,000. On the Confederate 
side, Lee contended that his troops numbered less than 
40,000 which seems to be a considerate underestimate. 
Livermore trunks that 51,844 southern effectives were 
engaged against McClellan at Antietam, but adds the figure 
42 
might well be 58,844. 
'I'he 17th dawned gray and drizzly, but soon turned 
into a perfect Indian Summer day. The first phase of the 
battle began as Hooker's 1st Corps moved southward at 5:30 A.M., 
on the Hagerstown Pike. Meade's division was in the center 
with Ricketts and Doubleday forming the flanks. Hooker's 
objective was to take the high ground around the white 
Dunker Church where the Smoketo~m and· Hagerstown roads 
meet. 'l'o take this church, Hooker had to pass through a 
thirty acre cornfield belonging to D. R. Miller and through 
woods parallel to the cornfield known as East and West 
Woods. Confederate artillery fire from the East started 
as soon as it was light. Hooker's answer was to open a 
frontal artillery fire of grape and canister on the 
42Hassler, p. 271. 
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grayclad infantry concealed amid the high stalks of the 
cornfield. The Federals then charged toward Miller's barn 
and cornfield. After running through the cornfield the 
Union soldiers leaped the fence at the south end of the 
field only to be cut down by the hundreds. The Northern 
lines fell and the "Yanks" ran back into the cornfield 
seeking shelter. On the Union right, Confederates swarmed 
out of the West Woods to charge Gibbon's exposed guns. 
Gibbon's gunner~ double charged their cannon with cannister 
and forced the Confederates to flee for shelter. On the 
left, Rickett's division held the edge of East Woods. The 
fierceness of this battle is shown in Hooker's report of 
the cornfield fighting. 
Every stalk of corn in the northern and 
greater part of the field was cut as closely 
as could have been with a knife, and the 
slain lay in rows precisely as they had 
stood in thei43ranks a few moments before, ••• 
The first clash had sent Lawton's staff running 
to the rear in search of Hood for reinforcements. All 
Confederate brigades from Early's right had been swept 
away (see Map V, p.36 }, and Hood deployed his troops 
in the southern edge of the cornfield. Hood expresses 
his fear: 
As his veterans doggedly loaded and fired, 
they had to pass over dead men who lay 
in rows where the Federal fire had swept 
them in the first blast of the battle. 
43orricial Records of the War of Rebellion, Vol. XIX, 
Part One, Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1880. 
"Never before," said Hood, "was I so 
continuously troubled with fear that my 
horse would further injure some wounded 
fellow sp~dier, lying helpless on the 
ground."44 
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General Mansfield's XII Corps entered the field at 
7:00 A.M. "to support and relieve Hooker" but before the 
general could deploy his troops he fell mortally wounded 
in the East Woods (see Map VI, p. 37). General Williams 
took over command and tried to gather information from 
Hooker who had been.wounded. Hooker commented about 
his wound: 
My command followed the fugitives closely 
until we had passed the cornfield a quarter 
of a mile or more, when I was removed from 
my saddle in the act of falling out of it 
from loss of blood, having pr.~viously been 
struck without my knowledge. LI·? 
Hooker was replaced by Meade who promptly withdrew 
to regroup; the corps had suffered seriously (2470 killed 
and wounded) but it was not utterly dispersed as Sumner 
had falsely told in his reports. 
Williams' attack advanced toward the East and West 
Woods diverging as they moved forth. Greene's division 
met light resistance as they cleared the East Woods and 
flanked Hood out of the Miller cornfield. For a time 
Greene gained a foothold in the West Woods near Dunker 
Church which he held until 1:30 P.M. On the right or 
44Freeman, II, p. 208. 
45Johnson, II, p. 640. 
West Woods, Williams met heavy resistance and the Confeder-
ates held their line. During this sharp engagement, the 
Twelfth Corps lost approximately l, 700 men out of about 7,000 
engaged. It was noWt 9:00 A.M., and the second of successive 
Federal corps attacks had ground to a halt.4-6 
Following the Mansfield (Williams) attack, Hood's 
di.vision fell back to Dunker Church for rest and ammunition. 
Hood describes the fierceness of the battle in this 
plea: 
For God's sakes, more troops cried Hood. 
When a brother-officer rode over and 
asked, "Where is your Division?" Hood4 
answered grimly, &Dead on the Field." 7 
The battle line had changed directions from north 
to east as a result of the first Union advance. At 9:30 
A.M. General Sumner's II Corps of 10,000 men went into 
action east of Dunker Church. Sumner deployed his .men 
into three battle lines sixty to seventy yards apart 
without a single regiment as flankers on the right or 
left (see Map VII, p. 38). 'fhe corps moved forward with 
French's division on the far left, Greene of William 1 s 
corps holding near the church, and Sedgwick's division 
to the right. Sedgwick failed to connect his line with 
Greene and thus his division charged into the West Woods 
by itself. The effects of that charge were disastrous. 
46Edward J. Stackpole, "'Showdown at Sharpsburg," 
Civil War 1J.limes Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962), 
p. 4;. 
47Freeman, II, p. 209. 
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Jackson had just placed McLaws and Walker in the West Woods 
and they hit Sedgwick from three sides. 'l'wenty-two hundred 
of his five thousand men died or were wounded in fifteen 
minutes. Sedgwick received his third wound of the day as 
the troops fell back in disordered retreat. Union artillery 
stopped McLaws 1 counterattack but not before the entire 
Federal line had been pushed back to a line west of the 
conflict. 48 
For all practical purposes the battle on the extreme 
right was over by ten o 1 clock. '.11he results of fl ve hours 
of fierce fighting on Jackson's front netted 6,000 Confeder-
ates killed or wounded, while the Federals lost 7,000 killed 
or wounded. One-third of McClellan's army (six divisions) 
had failed to break the Confederate line.49 The signifi-
cance of the battle was shown by McClellan's telegraph to 
Halleck. 
We are in the midst of the most terrible 
battle of the war--perhaps of history. 'I1hus 
far it looks well, but I have great odds 
against me. Hurry up all the troops possible. 
Our loss has been terrific, but we have gained 
much ground. I have thrown the mass of the 
army on the left flank, Burnside is now 
attacking the right, and I hold my small 
reserve, consisting of Porter's Fifth Corps, 
ready to attack the center as soon as the 
flank movements are developed. I hoge that 
God will give us a glorious victory.JO 
48Johnson, II, pp. 6lt3-44. 
49Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated, 
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 198. 
50Eckenrode, p. 198. 
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The second phase of the battle of Antietam centered 
around Sunken Road and the Roulette-Clipp farm buildings. 
French's division on Greene's left and Richardson's 
division combined assault drove the Confederates from the 
farm buildings and the Sunken Road. The Confederates 
fought fearlessly in defending the Sunken Road. The road 
was piled full of Confederate dead and ca.me to be known as 
"Bloody Lane." The fighting was furious--no quarter was 
asked and none given. The battle raged from 10:00 A.M. 
to l:OO P.M. but the Confederates (after losing considerable 
ground) held their line. The Union army paid a high price 
for the victory at "Bloody Lane" with the loss of Division 
Commander Richardson and approximately 3,000 men. General 
Longstreet summed up the entire battle in referral to his 
troops: 
They were 'badly whipped" in Longstreet's words, 
but they wouldn't admit. the fact, and since 
McClellan didn't seem to know when or where 
he was ahead of the game, it became ~Iident 
that Lee was as yet far from licked.? 
At 2:00 P.M. Franklin's VI Corps of 10,000 men crossed 
the creek and Franklin suggested another attack on Lee's 
left. Sumner {probably influenced by Sedgwick's defeat) 
decided against this move as shown by McClellan's writings: 
Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided opinion 
against another attempt during that day to 
assault the enemy's position in front, as 
portions of our troops were so much scattered 
51Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated, 
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 46. 
and demoralized. In view of these circumstances, 
after making changes of some of the troops, 
I directed the diffe5~nt commanders to hold 
their positions ••• 
Franklin's reserve corps was not committed and remained 
in support of the Federal right. In the center of the 
Union lines Fitz-John Porter's V Corps was also held in 
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reserve as was Pleasanton' s cavalry. 1.'he Union commander 
turned to defensive measures after realizing this was tha 
only force that stood between the enemy and the Federal 
supply train on the Boonesboro Pike.53 
'l'he final phase of the battle shifts to the Confederate 
right where D. R. Jones with 2000 men was defending a mile 
of front against Burnside's four divisions (13,000 men). 
McClellan sent a message to Burnside at 8:00 A.M. to take 
the bridge which bears his name. Two couriers and five hours 
later the bridge was finally taken. Burnside dallied all 
morning and failed to look for fords on the creek. It 
apparently never occurred to Burnside or Cox to test the 
depth of the water in the creek. Had they done so, they 
would have found that it could have been easily waded at 
almost any place.54 
Burnside's first attempt to cross the bridge was 
given to Colonel George Crook and his three regiments of 
Ohioans. They formed their battle-lines in a valley 
52McC1ellan, p. 601. 
53Tilberg, p. 39. 
54Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated, 
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 47. 
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one-eighth mile from the bridge, charged over the hills 
boldly, lost their way, and missed the bridge completelyL 
The Federals came out on a. low plateau in the bend of the 
creek with several rebel guns trained on them. Crook 
got his Ohioans to the bank and fired at the Confederates 
but Burnside's first assault was hardly more than a fizzla.55 
General Burnside's next assault was given to the 
5lst Pennsylvania and 5lst New York. 
Colonel Edward Ferrero said, "as a personal 
request General Burnside wants you to take the 
bridge, will you do it?" 
Some Corporal in the Pennsylvania 
regiment sang out, "Will you give us our 
whisky Colonel, if we make it?• . 
Ferrero blinked and laughed, •yes, 
by God," he shouted1 
Some days later, at a ceremony with 
Ferrero getting a brigadier's commission for 
valor, some Pennsylvanian called out, "How 
about that whisky?" 
Ferrero heard.it, grinned and turned his 
head long enough to say: "You'll get it"--
and next morning a keg of the stuff was sent 
over from the brigade headquarters and the 
long dry spell was over.56 
Needless to say the 5lst did cross the bridge at 
1:00 P.M. before the Confederate artillery could be 
trained on them. By 3:00 P.M. the entire II Corps had 
crossed Antietam Creek and was attacking Jones' brigade 
on the crest east of Sharpsburg (see Map VIII, p. 39). 
The attackers moved slowly and cautiously toward Sharpsburg 
carrying the Confederate brigades of Kemper, Drayton, and 
New 
55Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Armz~ Garden 
York: Doubleday & Company, pp. 3o7-o~. 




Garnett. Jenkin's brigade which was on higher ground held 
on but by 4:00 P.M. the battle on the Confederate right was 
nearly lost. Another 1200 yards farther west and the 
Federals would have cut the Confederates left line of 
retreat {Sharpsburg-Shepherdstown Road).57 
Disaster was in the making and at the Confederacy's 
darkest hour A. P. Hill in his red battle shirt appeared 
with 3,000 men from Harper's Ferry. When Hill met Lee, 
tradition has it that Lee embraced him in relief .58 After 
a brief rest Hill's men were deployed on the extreme right 
and they marched into battle. Hill met Harland's brigade 
in the cornfield. 1rhe new Union brigade allowed Hill• s 
men, who were wearing the blue uniforms that they had 
captured at Harper's Ferry, to approach too close before 
being challenged. Suddenly, there was a crash of musketry 
at short range from the advancing "bluecoats" and the 
Federals broke in confusion.59 In an attempt to bring the 
Union left into position, Rodman fell mortally wounded. 
Orders were sent to Willcox and Crook to retire their 
troops and the entire Union line retreated in good order 
to the west bank of the Antietam. A. P. Hill fought with 
such vigor that Burnside's men probably felt that he was 
still carrying a grudge. 
Before the war A. P. Hill and McClellan 
had been rivals for the hand of' the 
57Freeman, II, PP• 220-21. 
58Ibid., P• 222. 
59Hassler, p. 289. 
beautiful Ellen Marcy daughter of an 
army officer. She chose McClellan at 
last, and (as the soldiers believed) 
Hill carried a great anger against the 
successful suitor, which accounted for 
the violence of his attacks, ••• 
when a rattle of firing aroused the 
army and told it that Lee's men were 
attacki~, one veteran growled disgus-
tedly: God 1 s sake, Nellie why didn't 
you marry him?"60 
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As night fell the battle of Antietam came to a 
close. The Union soldiers entrenched near the Creek fell 
to their knees and slept on their rifles. The bloodiest 
day in American history had come to a close with the 
Union army losing approximately 12,400 men and the 
. 61 Confederates 13,700 men. This infamous carnage was 
described by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Powell, the 
Fifth Corps historian, as he passed over the battlefield. 
The historian of this work rode over 
it ••• particularly that part where Generals 
Hooker and Sumner fought. He passed where 
now blighted stalks only indicated the field 
of waving corn when the battle commenced, 
and saw the dead lying all through its 
aisles; then cut into the barren field.beyond 
where bodies attired mainly in Confederate 
uniforms were lying in ranks so regular 
that they must have been mowed down in 
swaths. Burying parties were already 
busily engaged, and had put away to rest 
many Union men~ Still here, as everywhere, 
they were scattered over the fields. The 
ground was strewn with muskets, knapsaks, 
cartridge boxes, and articles of clothing, 
with the carcasses of horses, and with 
thousands of shot and shell. Glancing at 
each corpse, he passed on the road by the 
Dunkard Church. Could it be that those 
were the faces of his late antagonist? 
60catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 318. 
6l!bid., P• 293 • 
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They were so absolutely black that they 
looked as if they might be negroes. Their 
eyes in many instances were protruding 
from their sockets: their heads, hands 
and limbs were swollen to twice their 
natural slze. rrheir :ms.~rea and bloated 
remains, emptied of all that made them 
manlike-human were simply repulsive. 
A.nd thus it was, with an almost 
sickening sensation he rode over this 
graveyard of unburied dead. No matter 
in what direction he turned, it was all 
the same shocking picture, awakening 
awe rather than pity, benumbing the 
senses rather than touching the heart, 
glazing the eye with horror rather 
than filling. tt with tears. And t~2 
was the war ~n all its hideousness. 
The following day McClellan wired Halleck about the 
battle. 
The battle of.yesterday continued for 
fourteen hours and until after dark. 
We held all we had gained except a 
portion of the extreme left; that was 
obliged to abandon a part of what it 
had gained. Our .losses were heavy, 
especially in general officers. The 
battle will probably be renewed today. 
Send all.the troops that yo~ can by 
the most expeditious route.b3 
Neither army renewed the battle on the 18th but 
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rather spent the day removing the wounded, burying the 
dead, and giving rest to the fatigued. 'I1he night of the 
18th, Lee moved his army across the Potomac at Shepherds-
town and back into Virginia. '11he retreat went unmolested 
by the Union army. 
McClellan has· been severely criticized for his: 
inaction of Thursday, the 18th of September. The writer 
62rbid., p. 290 
63Eckenrode, p. 205. 
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feels that there were several reasons for the Federal 
commander's inaction. First, McClellan knew the desperate 
condition of his men, but he did not know that Lee's 
brigades had suffered even worse. Secondly, most of 
McClellan•s subordinates discouraged the resumption of the 
attack because of the belief of Lee's superiority in 
numbers. This belief was based on a mistaken report 
from the secret service and the error was accepted by 
officers and men.64 Finally, there was no cause for the 
Union army to risk a serious reverse. Lee's Maryland 
campaign was ruined and there was nothing left for him 
to do but recross the Potomac. A renewal of the battle 
would have given the Confederates a chance to snatch 
victory out of failure.65 
The results of the battle of Antietam compelled 
Lee to alter his strategy and abandon his first invasion 
of enemy territory. President Lincoln seized this oppor-
tunity to issue his Emancipation Proclamation. Lee's 
repulse in Maryland possl bly kept the British government 
from recognizing Southern independance. Overall, the 
battle of Antietam was a strategic defeat for the South, 
a moral victory for the North, and a source of renewed 
determination on both sides to fight on to ultimate 
victory. 
64Freeman, p. 658. 
65Eckenrode, p. 206. 
Map I 33 
General Strategy of Maryland Campaign 
P .. .-.eellville. 
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GENERAL OR STRATEGIC MAP-Lee's route (indicated by 11 line 
of heavy dots) is shown from the Manassas battlefield to Frederick, 11t 
which point his comm .. nd divides for the Harpers Ferry operation. The 
routes of Long<lr""' 1 ... I fagerstown, and Jachon, Mclaws, alld Wal•er 
to Harpers Ferry are shown also. McClellan's advance in three columns 
to Frederick is indicated by heavy broken lines. This advance is then 
co11tinued as far as South Mountain. The Federal routes from that point 
ere omitted, for clarity, but may be derived from the text.· 
CAPTURE OF HARPERS FERRY-The positions of Jackson's divisions 
-Hill, Lawton, and Jones-on the night of September 13, and their 
routes from there to their attack positions are shown here. The initial 
positions of Walker's and Mclaws' divisions on Loudoun Heights and 
Elk Ridge are also shown, together with Walker's route on to Harpers 
Ferry, and Mclaws' route to Maryland Heights, which he captured on 
the 14th. The Federal lines at the north end of Bolivar Heights are 
shown as solid lines. The artillery symbols, shown for the Confederates 
only, represent batteries and battalions, not single guns. 
•. 





CONTOUR INTERVAL JOO FEET 
BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN-For the Federals the initial and 
final positions are shown; for the Confederates, only their first positions. 
The Federal units were committed successively, not simultaneously, 
but this could not have been portrayed except by using several maps. 
General Reno fell in Wise's field, which is the small clearing just to 
the left of the symbol marked "Hood." 
Map IV 
Cramptons Gap 
BATTLE OF CRAMPTON'S GAP-This portrays the situation at 
3 p. m. on Sunday, Sept. 14, 1862, when Franklin launched his 
attack; and the positions reached by his troops two hours later. The 









SLAUGHTER in the CORNFIELD-The situation about 7 a. m., 
when Hooker's attack had reached ih height, is indicated here. The 
fighting is swirling around the West Woods and in D. R. Miller's 
cornfield. Mansfield's XII Corps is coming in to join Hooker, About this 
time Mansfield ·is fatally wounded, being succeeded by Brig. Gen. A. 




FEDERAL ARMY IS COMMITTED PIECEMEAL-The situation is 
shown from about 9 to 9:45 a. m. Sumner's corps has been thrown in, 
and with Mansfield's (Williams') is pressing the attack toward West 
Woods and also the sunken road (Bloody Lane). Lee's divisions are in 
a critical condition, with heavy losses, and being assailed by successive 
heavy blows. But Mclaws is deploying, having just arrived from Harpers 
Ferry, and Anderson has nearly reached the battle line. This is the 





A. P. HILL TO THE RESCUE-Burnside has finally forced a crossing 
at the stone bridge which now bears his name, and his divisions are 
slowly advancing toward Sharpsburg. At this juncture, so critical for 
.. , 
I 
Lee, A. P. Hill's division arrives from Harpers Ferry, and shortly is 
launch~d in a counterattack against Burnside's flank. This stops Burn· 
side, and soon McClellan gives up any further effort to attack. 
CWT Illustrated-August, 1962-Page 47 
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